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The Volatility Curse: Revisiting 





The volatility of unanticipated output growth in income per capita is detrimental to long-run 
development, controlling for initial income per capita, population growth, human capital, 
investment, openness and natural resource dependence. This effect is significant and robust 
over a wide range of specifications. We unravel the effects of volatility by opening the black 
box and conditioning the variance of growth shocks on several country characteristics. 
Natural resource dependence, physical and institutional barriers to trade and associated policy 
shocks increase volatility sharply and harm growth through this indirect channel. The robust 
indirect effect of natural resources through volatility trumps any direct effects on economic 
development, even if natural resource dependence is measured net of extraction costs. 
Financial development appears to mitigate the harmful causes of volatility. Our panel data 
estimation confirms our cross-country results, but we also offer evidence that well developed 
financial systems amplify the effect of short-term terms-of-trade volatility on macroeconomic 
volatility. 
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1. Introduction 
Institutions, geography and culture are often argued to be the main determinants of economic 
growth, but economic growth rates are much more variable than these persistent determinants 
(Easterly et al., 1993). It therefore seems natural to try to understand the deeper causes of 
macroeconomic volatility. Some highlight the volatility of commodity prices (Deaton, 1999; 
Blattman, Hwang and Williamson, 2007) and others the volatility of real exchange rates 
(Hausman et al., 2004; Aghion et al., 2006) or the volatility of inflation and government spending 
(Fatás and Mihov, 2005). A different approach uses decomposition analysis to identify four 
reasons why poor countries are relatively volatile: they specialize in volatile sectors, specialize in 
fewer sectors, suffer from more frequent and severe aggregate shocks and macro fluctuations are 
more correlated with the shocks of the sector they specialize in (Koren and Tenreyro, 2007). 
Evidence on the direct effect of volatility on growth is provided by Ramey and Ramey (1995), 
whom emphasize policy shocks to explain volatility. We follow this latter tack, but probe deeper 
into the causes of unanticipated growth shocks in income per capita and compare the robustness 
of our results with a range of alternatives. We first demonstrate that volatility of unanticipated 
growth is much higher in Africa than in Europe or the US and show that volatility of 
unanticipated output growth depends on underlying factors like access to waterways, openness to 
international trade, natural resource dependence, financial development and government spending 
volatility. We allow for the direct effect of these factors on economic growth and for the indirect 
effect of these factors through volatility on economic growth. One important observation which 
this strategy yields is that in contrast to the earlier literature on the natural resource curse (Sachs 
and Warner, 1995), volatility appears to be an overlooked and important channel of the resource 
curse. This gives a new interpretation to what is sometimes also called the ‘paradox of plenty’ 
(Karl, 1997). To avoid omitted variable bias, we control in all our results for initial income per 
capita, population growth, investment and human capital. 
  Our investigations are motivated by some telling stylized facts. A glance at Figure 1 and 
Table 1 suggests that countries with a high standard deviation of annual growth in GDP per capita 
typically have lower growth rates. This is especially true for Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle 
East & North Africa and to a lesser extent for Asia and Latin America & Caribbean, since these 
economies are much more volatile than Western Europe and North America. Table 1 also 
indicates that countries with poorly developed financial systems are more volatile. In a 
companion paper we demonstrate that volatility is the quintessential feature of the resource curse 
and analyzed which features of resource dependence cause this link to do so much damage to a   2
country’s growth (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). The direct resource curse, which is not a 
robust effect, is trumped by the indirect effect through volatility. 
  
Figure 1: Volatile Countries Have Lower Annual Growth in GDP per Capita 
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Table 1: Growth, Volatility and Financial Development in the World 
Regional Characteristics (%, 1970-2003, at least 10 observations per country) 
Region 









 mean sd  (volatility)  mean mean mean
Middle East & North Africa (MENA)  1.18 8.12 41.41 24.75 26.98
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)  0.47 6.52 17.44 19.65 5.79
East Asia & Pacific (EAP)  2.47 5.00 51.77 16.71 4.44
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)  1.47 4.54 34.87 14.59 6.31
South Asia (SA)  2.41 4.41 17.33 4.77 1.31
Eastern Europe & Central Asia (ECA)  2.56 4.34 22.70 5.57 2.23
Western Europe (WE)  2.35 2.33 76.08 7.86 0.55
North America (NA)  2.09 1.90 109.36 5.88 3.41
1
st quartile Average 
 Financial Development (<=16.2)  0.70 6.40 10.38 17.06 5.14
4
th quartile Average Financial 
Development (>=52.9)  2.32 4.40 80.92 9.89 4.99
Note: Means are cross-country averages of country average growth rates or variable shares between 1970 and 2003. 
Standard deviations (sd) are the average cross-country standard deviations of country yearly growth rates or variable 
shares over the corresponding period. Financial development, resource exports and resource rents are expressed as shares 
of GDP. 
   3
In this paper our focus is to explain growth volatility in which resource dependence plays a key 
role. Firstly, we highlight the role played by financial development in the process of economic 
development. Financial development lowers the volatility of unanticipated output growth and 
mitigates the adverse effects of shocks to the resource export revenues, government spending and 
the terms of trade. These interactions are important for the direct effects of a given level of 
volatility on growth, but they also lower volatility itself. Second, we show that the benefits of 
financial development are more substantial in the long run. We give a prominent role to the 
quality of financial markets in understanding how volatility of natural resource export revenues 
may depress growth. Our results are motivated by the idea that large resource revenues make it 
easier to overcome negative liquidity shocks, and thus that more volatile resource revenues 
hamper innovation and growth when financial systems are poorly developed (cf., Aghion et al., 
2006). Thirdly, we use instrumental variables to allow for endogeneity of past investments. 
Fourthly, we offer various robustness checks including some panel estimates. Fifthly, we re-
examine the evidence for the volatility channel of the resource curse using rents rather than export 
revenues and suggest that the level of rents affects economic growth positively while volatility of 
rents harms growth 
  Section 2 offers some arguments why volatility may hurt growth performance. Section 3 
presents our econometric methodology. Section 4 discusses our cross-country evidence on the 
sources of macroeconomic volatility and their impact on growth in GDP per capita and on the 
importance of volatility in understanding the resource. Section 5 performs extensive robustness 
exercises and offers some panel estimates. Section 6 re-examines the evidence using natural 
resource rents. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Why Volatility of Natural Resource Revenues Might Hamper Growth? 
Aghion, et al. (2006) shows that macroeconomic volatility driven by nominal exchange rate 
movements may stunt innovations and thus depress growth in economies with poorly developed 
financial institutions and nominal wages not reacting immediately to changes in prices. We adopt 
this argument to show that volatility in natural resource revenues, induced by volatility in primary 
commodity prices, curbs growth in economies with badly functioning financial systems. Let the 
law of one price holds, so that the price level Pt simply tracks the nominal exchange rate St. In 
other words, Pt = St Pt* where the foreign price level Pt* is normalized to unity. Nominal wages 
are pre-set not knowing the realization of the price level, that is Wt = φ At E[Pt] = φ At E[St], where 
At denotes productivity and φ <1 is a constant. Output follows from the production function Yt = 
At  √lt, where lt denotes employment. Profits are πt  ≡  At  St  √lt  −  φ A t E[St]  lt. The value of   4
innovations the next period is Vt+1 = V Pt+1 At+1 , where next period’s productivity is given by At+1 
= γ At with γ > 1 if entrepreneurs have sufficient funds to innovate and At+1 = At otherwise. Firms 
have sufficient funds (profits plus resource revenues Qt) to innovate if they have enough cash 
flow to cope with adverse liquidity shocks, i.e., μ (πt + St Qt) > z Pt At where μ is a measure of 
financial development and z is a random liquidity shock. If liquidity shocks z are i.i.d. across 
firms with cumulative density function F(z), the probability of innovation is given by: 
 














Higher profits or natural resource revenues and a more developed financial system imply that 
more firms are able to overcome liquidity shocks and thus that the probability of innovation is 
higher. Profit maximization yields the following levels of employment and profits: 
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so that higher productivity, a lower expected price level (i.e., a lower wage) and a higher realized 
price level boost profits. The probability of innovation is thus given by: 
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The rate of economic growth increases with the expected probability of innovation: 
 
(4)   1 E[ ]
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Aghion, et al (2006) makes the assumption that the cumulative density function F(.) is concave, 
so that E[F(c)] ≤ F(E[c]). It follows that more exchange rate volatility stunts innovations and 
curbs growth, especially if the degree of financial development is weak. Moving from a peg to a 
float thus leads to a lower rate of economic growth. Here we are more interested in the effect of 
commodity prices on growth performance and the interpretation of equations (3)-(4) is as follows.   5
A high and stable level of resource revenues eases liquidity constraints and thus boosts 
innovations and economic growth. However, for a given expected level of natural resource 
revenues, more volatility in commodity prices and resource revenues harms innovation and 
growth, especially if financial development is weak.
1  
Real exchange rate uncertainty induced by swings in commodity prices (Cashin, et al., 
2002) exacerbates the negative effects of domestic credit market constraints, so that volatility of 
commodity prices is indeed expected to curb economic growth. Also, many resource-rich 
countries suffer from poorly developed financial systems and financial remoteness and thus suffer 
from bigger macroeconomic volatility (Rose and Spiegel, 2007). Such resource-rich countries 
with poorly developed financial systems are expected to have poor growth performance. 
When only debt contracts are available, bankruptcy is costly and the non-resource traded 
sector is small, shocks to the demand for non-traded goods and services – associated with shocks 
to natural resource income – are not accommodated by movements in the allocation of labour but 
by expenditure switching (Hausman and Ribogon, 2002). This demands much higher relative 
price movements. Due to bankruptcy costs, interest rates increase with relative price volatility and 
thus the economy specializes away from non-resource traded goods and services. The less it 
produces of these goods and services, the more volatile the economy becomes and the higher the 
interest rate has to be. This causes the sector to shrink until it vanishes. Others stress that resource 
revenues are used as collateral and encourage countries to borrow ‘excessively’, which harms the 
economy both in short and long run (Mansoorian, 1991). 
Windfall resource revenues can lead to ‘white elephants’, import substitution, 
unsustainable budgetary policies, and favours to political clientele, which cannot be financed 
once resource revenues dry up. Politicians lose sight of growth-promoting policies and ‘value for 
money’ management. Many developing countries have tried to promote state-led industrialization 
through prolonged import substitution using tariffs, import quota and subsidies for manufacturing 
in an attempt to avoid resource dependency. These policies may have been a reaction to the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate and the decline of the traded manufacturing sectors caused 
by natural resource dependence. Natural resource wealth may thus prolong bad policies, which 
eventually have to be reversed. The resulting policy-induced volatility harms growth and welfare. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Volatility in itself may also have a positive effect on growth through precautionary saving and thus more 
investment (Mirman, 1971) or if risky technologies also yield higher expected returns (Black, 1987). These 
channels are probably more relevant in economies with well developed financial markets. The net effect of 
volatility on growth will have to be settled empirically.    6
3. Estimation Methodology 
Consider a dataset with N countries and a sample period of T years. We specify the following 
econometric model for growth in GDP per capita (cf., Ramey and Ramey, 1995): 
 
(5)       70 log( ) , it i i t it yd λσε Δ= + + + X θ   
2 (0, ), 1,..., , 1,.., , it i Ni N t T εσ ==    
where yit is GDP per capita in country i for year t, σi is the standard deviation for country i of the 
residuals εit, Xi70 a vector of controls for country i and year 1970, and θ a vector of coefficients 
assumed constant across countries. The residuals εit are deviations of growth from predicted 
values based on the controls. The variances of these residuals do not depend on time, but do vary 
for each country. The standard controls included in Xi70 are initial log of GDP per capita, average 
share of investment in GDP, initial human capital proxied by average years of schooling for those 
older than 25 years in 1970 (Barro and Lee, 1993), and average annual population growth over 
the sample. Ramey and Ramey (1995) then find statistically significant estimates for λ of -0.211 
for a sample of 92 countries and -0.385 for the OECD countries. There is thus a negative 
relationship between volatility and conditional growth performance. In terms of the magnitude of 
the economic impact, volatility ranks third after the investment share and initial income per capita 
in the sample of 92 countries and second after initial income per capita for the OECD sample.  
We probe deeper and try to explain volatility (the standard deviation of the yearly error in 
the growth equation), in addition to testing whether natural resource dependence, openness and 
financial development exert direct effects on growth. We let long-run volatility depend on 
variables such as resource dependence, initial financial development and openness, and average 
distance from navigable rivers or coast. We collect these variables in the vector Zi70 and estimate 
the cross-country regressions: 
 
(6)   70 70 log( ) , it i i i t it yd λσε Δ= + + + + X θ Z β   
2
70 exp( ) ii c σ = + Z γ   and 
  
2 (0, ), 1,.., , 1,.., . it i Ni N t T εσ ==    
 
Average volatility σi is assumed constant over time, but different for each country depending on 
the initial country characteristics captured in Zi70. If countries are similar in terms of the Zi70, they 
are also predicted to have similar volatility. The vector of parameters γ measures the average 
across-country effect of factors like resource dependence, financial development and distance 
from waterways on volatility. We also allow for direct effects of these variables on growth (β).  
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where the covariance matrix is defined as 
2
70 exp( ), 1,.., , 1,.., , ii ci N t T σ == + = = t,ij Σ Z γ  and 
0, , 1,.., , ij t N =≠= t,ij Σ  and  1 70 70 ( ,.., )' with  log( ) , 1,.., . tN t i t i t i i i t yd t T εε ε λ σ ≡≡ Δ − − − − = t ε X θ Z β  
The error terms are uncorrelated across countries.
2  
 
4. Cross-country Evidence on Volatility and Growth Performance 
The stylized facts suggest that financial development and natural resources play a key role in 
understanding macroeconomic volatility and growth prospects. Once account is taken of the 
negative effect of cross-country variations in volatility on the rate of economic growth, resource 
dependence may exert a positive effect on growth.
3 From a policy perspective, we must know 
whether any adverse negative indirect effect of natural resources on growth via volatility of 
unanticipated output growth dominates any positive direct effect of resource dependence on 
growth. Furthermore, we want to test whether the adverse effects are weaker with well developed 
financial institutions. We first investigate, however, the geographical differences in volatility and 
their effect on growth. 
 
4.1. The detrimental effects of country-specific and regional volatility 
Table 2 provides cross-country empirical evidence on how much volatility of unanticipated 
output per capita growth depresses annual growth. Appendix 1 gives the definition of all the 
variables and their source of origin. The positive coefficients on the average investment share and 
initial human capital suggest that countries which invest a lot in physical and human capital enjoy 
a higher growth rate in income per capita, but the coefficient on human capital is not very 
significant. Similarly, countries with high population growth rates tend to have worse growth 
performance. And, of course, the significant negative coefficient on initial GDP per capita 
indicates that poor countries which start off with a low level of income per capita catch up and 
                                                 
2 We could also have explored the effects of autoregressive variances, but our time dimension is not very 
long and we have no strong prior about what the lags of the variance should be before 1970. 
3 In fact, if the explanatory variable is natural resource abundance (proxied by natural resource wealth, but 
only observed in 1996) rather than natural resource dependence, there appears to be a positive effect on 
growth performance (e.g., Ding and Field, 2005; Alexeev and Conrad, 2005; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 
2008). From our point of view, this does not seem surprising as natural resource wealth is much less 
volatile than natural resource export revenues and more likely to boost the rate of economic growth.   8
grow faster ceteris paribus (i.e., conditional convergence). Regression 1 is our benchmark 
regression, which indicates that volatility of unanticipated output growth negatively affects 
growth in GDP per capita (cf., Ramey and Ramey, 1995).  
 
Table 2: Natural Resource Curse and Regional Volatility 
Dependent Variable   yearly GDP growth per capita 1970-2003 
(constant 2000 international dollars, PWT 6.2)  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Mean equation   
Average  investment  share  of  GDP  1970-2003  0.108*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.070*** 0.079*** 0.058*** 
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) 
Average population growth rate 1970-2003  -0.472***  -0.484***  -0.484**  -0.346**  -0.326**  -0.509*** 
  (0.118) (0.147) (0.193) (0.145) (0.165) (0.151) 
log per capita GDP 1970  -0.012***  -0.012***  -0.012***  -0.009***  -0.011***  -0.011*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Human capital 1970  0.001*  0.001*  0.001  0.001*  0.001**  0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility (σi)  -0.110** -0.217***  -0.217***  -0.166*** -0.156**  -0.243** 
  (0.049) (0.060) (0.069) (0.048) (0.067) (0.112) 
Financial development 1970     0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.002  0.003 
    (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70    -0.000  -0.000  0.001  0.003  -0.004 
    (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
1st lag GDP per capita growth        0.266***  0.194***  0.238*** 
        (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) 
Natural resources 1970            -0.003 
        ( 0 . 0 2 1 )  
Natural resources 1970 * openness 1970            0.050* 
        ( 0 . 0 2 6 )  
Natural resources 1970 * Fin. Dev. 1970            -0.038 
        ( 0 . 0 5 8 )  
Constant  0.110*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.085*** 0.095*** 0.110*** 
  (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Variance equation        
Sub-Saharan  Africa       2.576***  2.568*** 
       (0.243)  (0.204) 
Middle-East & North Africa          3.490***  1.712*** 
       (0.744)  (0.256) 
Latin  America  &  Caribbean       1.550***  1.593*** 
       (0.152)  (0.174) 
Eastern Europe & Centra Asia          1.405***  1.418*** 
       (0.033)  (0.031) 
East Asia & Pacific          0.947***  1.009*** 
       (0.204)  (0.192) 
South  Asia       0.576***  0.455** 
       (0.188)  (0.184) 
Western  Europe       0.273*  0.204 
       (0.146)  (0.151) 
North  America       Reference  region 
(least  volatile)      (least  volatile) 
Constant  -3.823*** -5.754*** -5.754*** -5.595*** -7.771*** -7.797*** 
  (0.118) (0.260) (0.015) (0.024) (0.023) (0.031) 
Country dummies in variance eq.  yes  yes  yes  yes  no  no 
Observations  3448 2646 2646 2570 2570 2185 
Countries  103  79 79 79 79 65 
Log  likelihood  5898.5 4847.1 4847.1 4795.7 4329.8  4017.9 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions 3-6 use clustered standard errors (by country). 
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Regression 2 shows that this is robust to controls for openness and the initial level of financial 
development, which both do not have an effect on growth. One explanation may be that the 
effects of these variables are picked up by the effect of volatility on growth performance.  
We are worried that the errors in our explanation of growth in GDP per capita (‘growth 
shocks’) are not independent within countries. We therefore cluster the standard errors by country 
in regression 3 and all further regressions. The negative volatility effect is still significant. The 
correlation between growth shocks is made explicit in regression 4 where we include a lagged 
growth rate in the mean equation, showing the persistence of growth.  
In order to get an initial understanding of the sources and origins of volatility, regression 
5 explains volatility by regional dummies instead of country dummies. Interestingly, Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Middle-East and North Africa are much more volatile and thus suffer much more 
from bad growth prospects. If Sub-Saharan Africa would have the same volatility as East Asia 
and the Pacific, its long run annual growth rate would be 0.65 percentage point higher.
4 In 
contrast to much of the existing empirical literature, financial development, openness to 
international trade
5 and various interaction terms are statistically insignificant explanatory factors 
of cross-country variations in growth in GDP per capita. One possible explanation of this is that 
the effects of these variables are picked up by the effect of volatility on growth performance. We 
return to that in section 3.2. Regression 6 also indicates that, controlling for all traditional factors 
explaining cross-country differences in growth performance, there is no evidence of a traditional 
resource curse: natural resource exports as a percentage of GDP are insignificant and there is also 
no evidence that countries closed to trade or financially underdeveloped suffer from a curse.
6 
Regional dummies use more aggregate information than the country dummies and merely 
give insight in the geographical distribution of volatility. It is therefore important to try to explain 
why some countries are more volatile than other countries, which is what we turn to now. 
 
4.2. Opening the black box: Underlying determinants of volatility and the resource curse 
So far we have shown that volatility is an important drag on growth and that some continents, 
notably Africa, experience very unstable growth. Boom periods are followed by sharp busts 
which are destructive enough to harm growth in the long run. To understand what it is that makes 
some countries so unstable we allow volatility to depend on observable country characteristics in 
                                                 
4  { } 0.65% 0.156 exp( 7.771) exp(0.947) exp(2.576) =− ∗ − ∗ −  
5 We use the openness variable of Sachs and Warner (1997a) as expanded by Wacziarg and Welch (2008). 
Instead of ‘years open to trade’ we use initial (1970) openness to minimize reverse causality concerns.  
6 We use the openness variable of Sachs and Warner (1997) as improved and expanded by Wacziarg and 
Welch (2008).   10
Table 3: Underlying Determinants of Volatility and Correcting for Endogeneity 
Dependent Variable  










(constant 2000 international dollars, PWT 
6.2) 







Mean equation   
Average investment share of GDP ‘70-‘03  0.069***  0.054**  0.047*    0.126** 
 (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.025)   (0.052) 
1
st lag GDP per capita growth  0.164***  0.223***  0.224***  0.053**  0.217*** 
 (0.043)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.029) 
Average population growth rate 1970-2003  -0.470***  -0.503***  -0.492***  0.260  -0.467*** 
 (0.151)  (0.117)  (0.122)  (0.835)  (0.133) 
log per capita GDP 1970  -0.013***  -0.013***  -0.013***  -0.026**  -0.012*** 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.012)  (0.002) 
Human capital 1970  0.002**  0.001**  0.002**  0.013***  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Volatility (σi) -0.302***  -0.790***  -0.934***    -0.848** 
 (0.091)  (0.291)  (0.317)    (0.387) 
Financial development 1970  -0.011**  -0.014**  -0.017**  0.067*  -0.020*** 
 (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.038)  (0.006) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70  0.000  -0.006  -0.007  0.058***  -0.011** 
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.018)  (0.005) 
Natural resources 1970    0.020       
   (0.015)       
Point-source resources 1970      0.045*  0.242***  0.027 
     (0.027)  (0.040)  (0.030) 
Constant 0.128***  0.148***  0.163***  0.314***  0.142*** 
 (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.090)  (0.034) 
Landlocked dummy        -0.012   
       (0.013)   
% Population in Temperate Climate Zone        0.003   
       (0.026)   
Ethnic Fractionalization Index        -0.072***   




     
 
Financial development 1970  -1.695***  -1.200***  -1.271***    -1.284*** 
 (0.055)  (0.096)  (0.069)    (0.097) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70  -0.883**  -0.725***  -0.741***    -0.729*** 
 (0.350)  (0.207)  (0.167)    (0.087) 
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***    0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000) 
Natural resources 1970    1.185***       
   (0.282)       
Point-source resources 1970      1.385**    1.421** 
     (0.623)    (0.584) 
Diffuse resources 1970      0.426    0.590 
     (0.350)    (0.430) 
Constant -5.743***  -6.129***  -6.045***    -6.062*** 
 (0.268)  (0.057)  (0.059)    (0.025) 
         
F-stat. on excl. instruments 
(if only ethnic fractionalization used) 
      4.47 
(11.79) 
 
Hansen overidentification J-statistic  
(p-value) 
      0.143  
R2       0.72  
Country dummies in variance eq.  no  no  no  no  No 
Observations 2471  2024  2024  2024  2024 
Countries 76  62  62  62  62 
Log likelihood  3968.3  3620.0  3622.3  3812.1  3622.7 
Clustered (by country) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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regression 7, such as openness to trade, financial development, and geographic isolation as 
captured by the average distance to navigable rivers or the coast. Countries where firms and 
households have better access to credit and the financial sector is more developed, can count on 
much lower volatility and thus improved growth prospects (Aghion et al., 2006; Rose and 
Spiegel, 2007).
7 The same holds for openness to international trade. It appears that their effects on 
growth work primarily through the volatility channel. Physical barriers to trade indeed increase 
volatility, since they limit diversification of sectors (Malik and Temple, 2006). Regression 8 tests 
whether there is any evidence for a natural resource curse along the lines of Sachs and Warner 
(1995). Interestingly, we do not find any significant direct effect of resource dependence on 
growth once volatility is taken account of. On the other hand, resource dependence has a sizeable 
and significant positive effect on volatility, confirming our suspicion that volatile world 
commodity prices are a major cause of macroeconomic volatility and poor growth performance in 
resource dependent countries.
8 The volatility coefficient λ has increased in magnitude. This is 
because we force countries with similar initial characteristics to have similar volatility, something 
which the parsimonious country dummies did not. 
 
4.3. Instrumenting to deal with endogenous nature of investment shares 
Investment leads to growth, but we have to address the fact that growing countries may also 
attract more investment, so the direction of causality may go either way. Even though we control 
for openness and financial development, we probably do not capture enough of the institutional 
effects on growth and investment. In addition, our measure of natural resource dependence may 
be too broad, which is why we split it into point-source
9 and diffuse resources
10. We therefore 
look for an exogenous variable that strongly predicts the investment share, but does not affect 
growth or correlate with other important unobserved characteristics. We choose to instrument the 
investment share with an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. This index measures the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not belong to the 
                                                 
7 The direct effect of financial development on growth is actually negative. Since the effect of financial 
development on volatility is already controlled for, this could reflect that highly financially developed 
countries were also rich countries in 1970. The negative coefficient could therefore reflect the conditional 
convergence effect of initial GDP per capita.  
8 This result complements other transmission channels of the resource curse, see Gylfason (2001). 
9 These include oil, gas, ores and minerals, which are typically produced in concentrated locations. 
10 Diffuse natural resources include agricultural raw materials and foods such as livestock, coffee, bananas 
or tobacco, which are typically produced throughout the country.   12
same ethnic group (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a).
11 The rationale is that trust, ability to 
communicate and social cohesion are essential prerequisites for successful investment. 
Fractionalized countries have lower levels of trust, more corruption, less transfers, subsidies and 
political rights (Alesina et al, 2003). These factors should lower the investment rate, since they 
increase uncertainty about returns and expropriation.
12 We also assume that ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization is randomly ‘assigned’ to countries and mostly historically determined. 
Countries should also not have systematically different growth rates depending on their degree of 
ethnic fractionalization. We suspect that this is the case given the very different growth 
experiences of countries among the top-ten of ethnic fractionalization, i.e., Canada, Senegal, India 
and Mali. In the bottom-ten of least fractionalized countries are Norway, Japan, Tunisia, and 
Greece. We also include two geographical variables: whether a country is landlocked or not, and 
a climate variable. Investment opportunities may be lower if it is more difficult for a country to 
diversify and export. Alesina et al. (2003) also find strong correlations between ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization and geographical variables. This allows us to isolate the effect of 
fractionalization on investment and to conduct a Hansen over-identification test for exogeneity of 
the instruments.  
Regressions 9b and 9c of Table 3 report the first and second stage of this IV regression 
and confirm the detrimental effect of volatility on growth. Although the positive effect of 
investment shares on growth are now bigger, the qualitative results are similar to the ML 
estimates presented in regression 9a.
13 The first stage confirms that ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization has a strong effect on the investment share. The F-test on the excluded 
instruments is unfortunately below 9.08 (5% critical value for 3 instruments) which means that 
the relative bias of using these instruments is slightly larger than 10% of the inconsistency of 
regression 9a. Our estimate of investment on growth is therefore still biased downwards (Stock 
and Yogo, 2002). However, if we repeat the IV regressions with only ethnic fractionalization we 
                                                 
11 They base their data on the World Christian Encyclopedia. They argue that fractionalization is a poor 
predictor of civil war compared to ethnic polarization. We are therefore more confident that there is no 
effect of fractionalization on growth via the link of conflicts.  
12 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b) argue that ethnic polarization affects investment but not growth, 
while fractionalization affects growth directly as in Easterly and Levine (1997), but not investment. 
However, these growth regressions do not control for population growth or volatility. If we run regression 
9a with ethnic fractionalization and polarization using their ethnicity data, we find no growth effects of 
these two variables. Adding polarization to the first stage yields no effect of polarization, but still gives a 
significant negative effect of fractionalization on investment. Taking the effect of volatility into account 
seems to have important effects on the link between ethnicity and growth, and should be seen as 
complementary. Regressions are available on request. 
13 Volatility is not included in the first stage, because strictly speaking this variable is based on the second 
stage errors. This should not effect our results, since non-instrument exogenous variables are only included 
for efficiency reasons.    13
get an F-test value of 11.79. Ethnic fractionalization is therefore a strong predictor of investment, 
but we note that the true effect of investment on growth should be slightly higher in the reported 
2
nd stage regressions. On the other hand, using all three instruments allows us to test for their 
exogeneity. The Hansen test
14 is passed and implies that our instruments are exogenous. The first 
stage of the IV regressions shows a large and significant positive correlation with natural resource 
dependence and the investment share. We cannot claim that this corresponds to a causal effect, 
but it further explains the positive (although insignificant) direct effect of resource dependence on 
growth after controlling for volatility.
15 
 
4.4. Additional determinants of volatility 
The fact that resource exports are so important to explain volatility leads us to add two domestic 
and one external effect in Table 4 which may have important explanatory power for a country’s 
output volatility. They also include year dummies in the mean equation to allow for world-wide 
yearly effects which may influence growth directly, such as growth and recessions of large 
countries, and for example fuel prices. Regression 10 compares directly to regression 8 of Table 3 
and shows no qualitative differences. The first domestic factor is the volatility of the size of 
government (as a percentage of GDP) from year to year. The revenue, or loss, from sudden 
changes in resource prices often translates quickly in spending booms or busts in countries with 
weak institutions. This is essentially a policy variable which can have large effects on growth, the 
more so if natural resources are an important source of income.  
Regression 11 shows indeed a large effect of government spending volatility on output 
volatility. Controlling for this variable lowers the direct effect of resources on volatility somewhat 
and significantly increases the log likelihood. Part of spending booms and busts may be explained 
by competing factions within a country. Ethno-linguistic polarization is a significant predictor of 
civil war according to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a). We expect that it therefore also 
affects output volatility. Regression 12 shows that it is indeed significant and also lowers the 
effects of both resource dependence and government spending volatility. This indicates that 
                                                 
14 Robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
15 A complicating factor is that the predicted investment share in regression 9c is a generated regressor 
(Pagan, 1984), which causes standard errors to be too small (although coefficients are consistently 
estimated). A common solution is to block bootstrap the standard errors, which re-samples every 
replication from within each cluster (each country) to allow errors to be correlated within countries, but 
independent between countries. Since it is very difficult to achieve convergence of the log likelihood 
function for every replication, we use the fact that block bootstrapping is asymptotically equivalent to panel 
robust sandwich standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The latter correction of the standard errors is 
what we use in all regressions, including 9c, to allow for within-country correlation of the errors. We can 
therefore directly interpret the results.   14
natural resource dependence in itself is not necessarily bad. It is rather how a country deals with 
the proceeds, and whether it is able to smooth the resource revenues, that determine the effect on 
volatility.  
The external factor highlighted in regression 13 is the fluctuation in changes of the terms 
of trade (exports over imports). This captures the resource effects as they influence the value of  
 
Table 4: Additional Determinants of Volatility and the Role of Financial Development 
 
Dependent Variable   yearly GDP growth per capita 1970-2003      





11 12 13 10′ 13′ 
Mean equation        
Average investment share of GDP  0.044*  0.048*  0.049*  0.064**  0.048*  0.064** 
  (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
1st lag GDP per capita growth  0.224***  0.226***  0.223***  0.224***  0.222***  0.224*** 
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031) 
Average population growth rate 1970-2000  -0.490***  -0.376***  -0.317**  -0.326**  -0.496***  -0.325** 
  (0.120) (0.128) (0.138) (0.136) (0.123) (0.132) 
Initial log per capita GDP  -0.014***  -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.010*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Initial human capital 1970  0.002**  0.001 0.001* 0.001  0.002**  0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Volatility (σi)  -0.841***  -0.472***  -0.537***  -0.320** -0.807** -0.331** 
  (0.266) (0.177) (0.195) (0.129) (0.377) (0.130) 
Initial financial development  -0.016**  -0.009  -0.010*  -0.006 -0.014** -0.006 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy  -0.007  -0.000  -0.001  0.001  -0.007  0.001 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Natural resources 1970  0.019  0.013  0.012  0.009  0.019  0.010 
  (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) 
Constant  0.159*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.101*** 0.161*** 0.101*** 
  (0.026) (0.022) (0.021) (0.017) (0.030) (0.017) 
Variance equation        
Initial financial development  -1.615***  -1.227*** -1.234*** -1.039*** -1.340*** -0.710*** 
  (0.086) (0.180) (0.125) (0.103) (0.277) (0.100) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy  -0.841***  -0.921***  -0.876***  -0.496***  -0.843***  -0.490*** 
  (0.189) (0.172) (0.162) (0.101) (0.174) (0.128) 
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.000***  0.001**  0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Natural resources 1970  1.038***  0.683***  0.567**  0.123  2.741***  0.125 
  (0.352) (0.219) (0.265) (0.392) (0.533) (0.298) 
Government spending volatility 70-03    11.703***  10.226***  9.674***    9.729*** 
    (1.451) (1.138) (2.250)    (2.646) 
Ethnolinguistic Polarization index      0.342***  0.201***    0.169*** 
     (0.096)  (0.050)  (0.048) 
sd ToT index growth 70-03        5.963***    6.909*** 
       (0.265)  (0.452) 
Fin. Dev. * Total resources          -8.982***   
         (2.863)   
Fin. Dev. * sd ToT growth            -4.399*** 
        ( 1 . 2 2 2 )  
Constant  -6.050*** -6.451*** -6.582*** -7.356*** -6.082*** -7.420*** 
  (0.048) (0.047) (0.026) (0.026) (0.045) (0.022) 
        
Year dummies in mean equation  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  2024 2024 2024 2024 2024 2024 
Countries  62 62 62 62 62 62 
Log  Likelihood  3723.5 3751.0 3753.9 3793.7 3727.9 3794.3 
Clustered (by country) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.      
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exports, and of imports through appreciation of the exchange rate. It is highly significant and 
lowers the direct effect of resource dependence on output volatility. Terms of trade and 
government spending shocks seem to be most important. 
 
4.5. Can financial development mitigate the causes of volatility? 
Table 4 also looks at the nonlinear effects that initial financial development may have on long-run 
output volatility. So far, we always found significant negative effects of financial development on 
output volatility. Regressions 10′ and 13′ correspond to 10 and 13, but each adds an interaction  
 
Table 5: Interacting Volatility with Initial Financial Development in Mean Equation 
  yearly GDP growth per capita 1970-2003 
  14 OLS  15 ML  16 ML 
Mean equation      
Average investment share of GDP 70-03  0.056**  0.043**  0.044** 
 (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
1st lag GDP per capita growth  0.168***  0.219***  0.219*** 
 (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Average population growth rate 70-03  -0.720***  -0.518***  -0.542*** 
 (0.174)  (0.103)  (0.102) 
Initial log per capita GDP  -0.010***  -0.015***  -0.015*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Initial human capital 1970  0.001  0.002***  0.002*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Volatility (σi) -0.546***  -0.799***  -0.722*** 
 (0.095)  (0.216)  (0.204) 
Natural resources 1970  -0.006  0.014  0.014 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Initial financial development  -0.052***  -0.029***  -0.031*** 
 (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy  0.002  -0.003  -0.001 
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Volatility (σi) * Fin.Dev.1970  1.983***  1.311***  1.458** 
 (0.519)  (0.441)  (0.588) 
Constant 0.111***  0.160***  0.155*** 
 (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
      
Variance equation      
Initial natural resources    1.056***  2.415*** 
   (0.366)  (0.359) 
Initial financial development    -1.575***  -1.382*** 
   (0.169)  (0.115) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy    -0.846***  -0.841*** 
   (0.233)  (0.173) 
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast   0.001***  0.001*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Fin. Dev. * Total resources      -7.067*** 
     (1.590) 
Constant   -6.076***  -6.101*** 
   (0.076)  (0.051) 
      
Year dummies in mean equation  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 2024  2024  2024 
Clusters 62  62  62 
Log Likelihood  3389.8  3728  3731.4 
Standard errors are clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.   16
 
term with financial development in the volatility regression. Clearly, those countries that were 
more financially developed in 1970 suffered much less from the effects that resource dependence 
and terms of trade shocks have on volatility. They are expected to have grown faster as a result. 
Well developed financial system can thus alleviate some of the harmful consequences of 
natural resource dependence and terms of trade shocks on macroeconomic volatility and growth.  
We develop this point further in Table 5 where we interact volatility with initial financial 
development in the mean equation. Column 14 repeats the positive interaction between volatility 
and financial development found in Aghion et al. (2005) and Kose et al. (2006)
16, where we also 
measure volatility by the standard deviation of output growth. Their OLS specification however 
does not allow for simultaneous conditioning of the variance itself. Regression 15 does and 
allows for an interaction of financial development with the predicted standard deviation of 
unanticipated growth shocks from regression 10.
17 The result is a significant positive coefficient 
while all other conditioning variables still explain variance and output growth rather well. 
Regression 16 is a similar expansion of regression 10′ of Table 4. Not only does financial 
development alleviate the strong effect of resources on volatility, it also cushions a country 
against harmful volatility itself. Increasing financial development from 20% to 30% would 
decrease the effect of volatility on growth to -0.4, while volatility itself would also be lower by 
0.3 %-points. This small increase in financial development results in 0.12%-points better yearly 
growth prospects, ceteris paribus.  
 
5. Robustness: OECD Sample and Panel Estimates 
Appendix 2 presents a comprehensive robustness exercise for our core regression 10 in section 4. 
The main result that volatility is harmful for growth and that volatility increases with resource 
dependence and decreases with financial development survives if we add the rule of law, 
incidence of malaria, inflation and size of government, a post-1973-oil-shock dummy or region 
dummies as additional explanatory variables. The main result also survives if we allow for a link 
between initial income and output volatility, correlation of growth shocks within countries and 
correlation across continents and time. We now examine the robustness of our results by 
empirically assessing the volatility curse for a sample of OECD countries in section 5.1 and then 
providing panel estimates with country fixed effects in section 2.  
 
                                                 
16 Kose et al. focus on financial integration measured as equity market liberalization and alternatively the 
ratio of gross capital flows to GDP which are correlated to the ratio of private credit to GDP.  
17 We use the predicted variance of the errors from the mean equation.    17
5.1. Is the detrimental effect of volatility greater in the OECD sample? 
Ramey and Ramey (1995) found evidence that the detrimental effect of volatility on growth was 
actually slightly larger in OECD countries. This is surprising, because OECD countries have a 
much higher level of development of institutions and financial markets. Table 6 explores whether 
our results hold for the much smaller OECD sample. The first column repeats regression ten with 
the full sample of countries and shows that average volatility within this sample is 4.4%. The 
second column shows that we also find a somewhat stronger effect of volatility on growth in 
OECD countries. This does not mean, however, that volatility is a bigger problem in these   
 
Table 6: Does the OECD Suffer from a Volatility Curse? 
Dependent Variable   yearly GDP growth per capita 1970-2003




10 OECD  13 OECD 
Mean equation     
Average investment share of GDP  0.044*  -0.015  -0.013 
 (0.025)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
1st lag GDP per capita growth  0.224***  0.284***  0.263*** 
 (0.027)  (0.045)  (0.047) 
Average population growth rate 1970-2000 -0.490***  -0.361**  -0.323** 
 (0.120)  (0.161)  (0.141) 
Initial log per capita GDP  -0.014***  -0.024***  -0.021*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Initial human capital 1970  0.002**  0.002***  0.002*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Volatility (σi) -0.841***  -1.086**  0.235 
 (0.266)  (0.504)  (0.256) 
Initial financial development  -0.016**  -0.006  0.008*** 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.003) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy  -0.007  -0.000  0.010*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Natural resources 1970  0.019  -0.044  0.036** 
 (0.015)  (0.044)  (0.016) 
Constant 0.159***  0.265***  0.191*** 
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.032) 
Variance equation     
Initial financial development  -1.615***  -1.311***  -0.713*** 
 (0.086)  (0.076)  (0.067) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy  -0.841***  -0.648***  -0.257*** 
 (0.189)  (0.068)  (0.058) 
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast 0.001***  -0.000***  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Natural resources 1970  1.038***  -7.787***  -4.356*** 
 (0.352)  (0.776)  (1.070) 
Government spending volatility 70-03      20.044*** 
     (4.775) 
Ethnolinguistic Polarization index      -0.762*** 
     (0.105) 
sd ToT index growth 70-03      8.037*** 
     (0.543) 
Constant -6.050***  -6.112***  -7.700*** 
 (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.038) 
      







Year dummies in mean equation  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 2024  782  759 
Countries 62  23  23 
Log Likelihood  3723.5  1947.2  1914.4 
Clustered (by country) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  18
 
developed countries. The standard error has also increased by enough to make both results 
indistinguishable from each other, and the predicted sample volatility for OECD countries is at 
least half that of the full sample. The net effect on growth is thus close to half what it is for the 
full set of countries, and much higher for the non-OECD countries. 
Regression 13 OECD, corresponding to 13 in the previous table, indicates that the 
significance of this difference actually disappears when we further condition volatility on 
government spending volatility, ethnic tensions, and volatility of the terms of trade. In fact, for 
the developed OECD countries there appear to be no negative effect of output volatility. They are 
sufficiently open to international trade and financially developed to balance the adverse effects of 
government spending booms and busts and fluctuations in the terms of trade, while these shocks 
themselves tend to be smaller as well.    
An interesting finding is that resource dependence does not increase volatility, but rather 
decreases it in OECD countries. Countries such as Norway and The Netherlands with significant 
resource exports have very stable institutions which may be able to turn around any resource 
curse into a blessing. This is further supported by the positive direct effect of resources on growth 
in the mean equation of regression 13 of Table 7. Consistent with the result that financial 
development can alleviate the resource curse, natural resources can be a blessing for countries 
with the institutional means to spend the proceeds wisely. 
 
5.2. Short-run panel perspective and fixed-effects estimation 
As is typically done in the literature we have so far focused on the cross-section variation in 
volatility by assuming constant average volatility over time. Here we allow volatility to be time 
dependent by building a five-year panel. Instead of using 1970 values of explanatory variables, 
we use values for 1970, 1975, 1980, and so on, in regressions 17, and non-overlapping five-year 
means in regressions 19-20, for each year within the respective 5-year period. However, for both 
the dependent variable and its lag, we still use yearly observations to yield five errors for each 
five-year period over which to calculate the volatility. For example, the ten growth rates between 
1970 and 1980 are regressed on five repeated initial values of 1970 and five initial values of 
1975, or regressed on five repeated means calculated over the years 1970-75, and five means 
calculated over the years 1975-1980. In both cases σit is the standard deviation over the errors of 
period t to t+5. This is a short time period for a standard deviation, but on the other hand it allows 
institutions and other determinants of growth and volatility to change over time. We estimate the 
following panel data specification:   19
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Zit now includes time-varying data on financial development, resource dependence, and so on, 
which also allows volatility to vary over time. As various countries become more open to the 
world economy over the years they may as a consequence become less volatile. This allows for a 
richer story than the hypothesis tested so far, namely that countries which were open in 1970 were 
less volatile in the 33 years thereafter. Furthermore, we can factor out the effect of unobserved 
fixed effects on growth. To do this, we apply the within-transformation (subtracting the mean of 
each variable over the period 1970-2003 per country from itself) on all variables and re-estimate 
the panel with maximum likelihood. The coefficients can then be interpreted as the effect of a 
change in the variable relative to its country-mean over time. σit is not de-meaned itself, but 
represents the volatility of de-meaned growth shocks. One possible drawback is that fixed-effects 
estimation also factors out important long-run country characteristics for which the parameters 
are of interest, such as average financial development and natural resource abundance. This is 
why fixed-effects regressions are not our core specification.  
Table 7 reports the panel estimates of the effects of volatility, natural resource 
dependence, financial development and openness (as well as investment rates, schooling, 
population growth and initial income per capita) on growth in GDP per capita. We find 
significant negative effects of volatility on growth in all cases, although short-run volatility over 
and above long-run volatility (which is absorbed by the fixed effects) is somewhat less 
significant. We see the most notable differences between the pooled regressions 17a and 18a, and 
the fixed-effects regressions 17b and 18b in the variance equation.
18 Most of the effects from the 
previous tables are still present in the pooled regressions. After controlling for country fixed 
effects (e.g., a country’s average level of financial development), we see that an increase in 
financial development does not significantly decrease volatility over a short run period of five 
years. The strongest remaining effect is that of volatility of changes in the terms of trade. This 
also affects short-run increases in volatility. 
The difference between regressions 18 and 13′ of Table 4 and 13 OECD of Table 6 is 
remarkable. Countries that were financially developed in 1970 could dampen the effect of long-
run terms of trade volatility on volatility of unanticipated output growth, but the effect works the  
                                                 
18 The observed fixed effects of distance to the nearest navigable river or coast and long run government 
spending volatility are factored out by the within transformation. Government spending did not vary 
enough across 5-year periods to be able to include it in regressions 17b, and 18b-20. We also left out ethno-
linguistic polarization as it limits the sample and would also be absorbed by fixed effects.    20
Table 7: Panel-ML Estimates of Volatility Curse 
 
Dependent Variable   yearly GDP growth per capita 1970-2003     










  5-yearly initial values  5-yearly non-overlapping averages 
Mean equation            
Investment share of GDP  0.034*  0.008  0.076***  0.101***  0.103***  0.021  0.100*** 
 (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.051)  (0.030) 
1
st lag GDP per capita growth  0.266***  0.101***  0.251***  0.090***  0.097***  0.270***  0.098*** 
 (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.047)  (0.029) 
Population growth rate  -0.356**  0.276  -0.307*  -0.021  -0.085  0.296  -0.107 
 (0.167)  (0.229)  (0.161)  (0.262)  (0.252)  (0.307)  (0.252) 
log per capita GDP  -0.012***  -0.019**  -0.010***  -0.005  -0.008  -0.012  -0.008 
 (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Human capital  0.001**  -0.000  0.001  -0.000  -0.001  0.001  -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Volatility (σit) -0.269***  -0.747**  -0.249**  -0.967*  -0.994***  -0.434***  -0.823*** 
 (0.098)  (0.362)  (0.110)  (0.503)  (0.345)  (0.161)  (0.284) 
Financial development  -0.001  -0.015  -0.002  -0.024  -0.029**  -0.106***  -0.021* 
 (0.003)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.040)  (0.012) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy  0.005  0.006  0.003  0.006  0.007  -0.007*  0.006 
 (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
Total resource share  0.015  -0.024  0.019  -0.013  -0.011  0.004  -0.019 
 (0.015)  (0.035)  (0.016)  (0.047)  (0.023)  (0.005)  (0.028) 
Constant 0.096***  0.047***  0.105***  0.037*  0.052***  -0.008  0.047*** 
 (0.027)  (0.016)  (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
            
Variance equation            
Financial development  -0.697***  -0.601  -0.663***  -0.783  -1.408***  -1.251**  -0.064 
 (0.059)  (0.510)  (0.084)  (0.640)  (0.380)  (0.506)  (0.543) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy  -0.256***  -0.080  -0.380***  -0.264  -0.249  0.600**  -0.270 
 (0.098)  (0.319)  (0.124)  (0.267)  (0.230)  (0.287)  (0.241) 
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast  0.000  -  0.000  -  -  -  - 
 (0.000)    (0.000)         
Total resources  2.436***  0.428  2.550***  0.478  0.561  -3.259  1.401 
 (0.239)  (2.632)  (0.479)  (2.921)  (1.384)  (4.565)  (2.014) 
5-yearly sd ToT index growth   5.269***  3.586***  4.590***  2.760**  1.774**  3.976**  3.006*** 
 (0.469)  (1.204)  (0.498)  (1.144)  (0.867)  (2.019)  (1.081) 
Government spending volatility 70-03  17.166***  -  17.208***  -  -  -  - 
 (2.030)    (3.466)         
Fin. Dev. * sd ToT growth          4.578***  15.369***   
         (1.070)  (2.590)   
Fin. Dev. * Total resources              -7.691*** 
             (2.565) 
Constant -7.615***  -6.369***  -7.487***  -6.282***  -6.301***  -7.833***  -6.302*** 
 (0.036)  (0.152)  (0.199)  (0.122)  (0.129)  (0.178)  (0.084) 
              
Observations 2261  2261  2497  2497  2591  849  2591 
Countries 89  89  90  90  94  27  94 
Log likelihood  4329.7  3989.9  4695.3  4301.6  4485.5  2119.1  4488.1 
sample mean of Fin. Dev.          0.001  0.001   
sample mean of sd ToT growth          -0.0003  -0.001   
sample mean of Fin. Dev. * sd ToT growth          0.0005  0.0002   
Clustered (by country) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Mean equations contain year dummies. Variables in columns 2 
and 4 are demeaned by country over time, where variance and standard errors are degrees-of-freedom adjusted. Distance to nearest navigable river or 
coast and government spending volatility are observed fixed effects.  
 
other way around in a short-run, fixed-effects regression both in the full sample and in the OECD 
sample. Short-run terms of trade volatility may coincide with credit booms, such as during the 
Asian crisis. In any case, the sample means for these variables (at the bottom of Table 7) are very 
small which shows that these short-run effects are less important than they appear. The effect of a   21
short-run increase in the value of natural resource exports has on the other hand no direct effect 
on volatility, but still interacts negatively with financial development. 
 
Table 8: Resource Rents and the Volatility Curse 








yearly GDP growth per 
capita 1970-2003 












Mean equation  Resource Rents 
Average investment share of GDP ‘70-‘03  0.094***   0.137**  0.151** 
 (0.019)   (0.066)  (0.071) 
1st lag GDP per capita growth  0.205***  0.068***  0.203*** 0.201***
 (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.028) (0.029) 
Average population growth rate 1970-2003 -0.692*** -0.236  -0.612*** -0.607***
 (0.105)  (0.964)  (0.142) (0.142) 
log per capita GDP 1970  -0.012*** -0.021  -0.012*** -0.012***
 (0.002)  (0.015)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Human capital 1970  0.000  0.012***  -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Volatility (σi) -0.843***   -1.069* -1.055***
 (0.286)    (0.584) (0.378) 
Point-source rent share 1970  -0.188*** 0.543**  -0.120 -0.132 
 (0.051)  (0.229)  (0.116) (0.085) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70 -0.009**  0.052**  -0.014* -0.015**
 (0.004)  (0.022)  (0.007) (0.006) 
Point-source rent share * openness  0.208**  -0.032  0.198* 0.201** 
 (0.101)  (0.064)  (0.102) (0.099) 
Financial development 1970  -0.027*** 0.066*  -0.031*** -0.031***
 (0.007)  (0.035)  (0.010) (0.006) 
Point-source rent share * Fin. Dev. 70  0.948***  -0.311  0.572*** 0.601***
 (0.144)  (1.691)  (0.207) (0.179) 
Constant 0.149***  0.281**  0.162*** 0.158***
 (0.021)  (0.116)  (0.043) (0.035) 
Landlocked dummy    -0.007    
   (0.012)    
% Population in Temperate Climate Zone    0.004    
   (0.032)    
Ethnic Fractionalization Index    -0.059*    
   (0.035)    
Variance equation 
Point based rent share 1970  2.449***    2.568 2.575** 
 (0.935)    (1.723) (1.272) 
Diffuse resources 1970  0.154    0.260 0.261 
 (0.783)    (0.626) (0.649) 
Financial development 1970  -1.423***   -1.430*** -1.430***
 (0.209)    (0.092) (0.167) 
Sachs Warner updated openness dummy 70 -0.709***   -0.717*** -0.717***
 (0.242)    (0.149) (0.085) 
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast 0.001***    0.001** 0.001***
 (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -5.974***   -5.958*** -5.959***
 (0.054)    (0.059) (0.073) 
      
F-stat. on excl. instruments   2.44  5.65 
Hansen overidentification J-statistic (p-
value)    0.366    n.a. 
Country dummies in variance eq.        
Observations  1980 1980 1980 1980 
R2 .  0.67  .  . 
Log likelihood  3584.0  3538.4  3576.2  3576.4 
Countries 59  59  59  59 
Robust and clustered standard errors by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 22d 
uses only Ethnic Fractionalization Index as an IV.   22
6. Resource Rents, Volatility and Growth Performance 
The level of rents may be a better measure of resource dependence than export revenue because it 
takes into account the production costs of resources. However, the resource rents data from the 
World Bank (2007) are not necessarily superior, since extraction costs are available for much 
fewer countries than resource revenues and are often proxied by regional/continental rather than 
actual costs. Rents data have the further drawback that they are available for a smaller sample and 
only for point-source resources. With this in mind, regression 21a indicates that the GDP share of 
point-source natural resource rents does exert a negative effect on growth in GDP per capita even 
after allowing for the effects of volatility on growth. Moreover, 21a shows significant interaction 
terms of natural resource rents with openness and financial development at the 1%-level. These 
were insignificant when we used resource revenues in section 4.1. This suggests that the resource 
curse is less pronounced for countries open to international trade and with well functioning 
financial systems. For more open countries with a high degree of financial development, the 
resource curse can even be turned into a blessing. As shown by regressions 21b-d, this finding is 
robust to instrumenting the investment variable using the same strategy as in section 4.3, with the 
qualification that our instruments are somewhat weaker in this specification than before, but 
perform better on the Hansen test.  
 
7. Conclusion 
We know that countries that are open to international trade, have good institutions and have high 
levels of education and investment have a better growth performance, while poor countries with 
high population growth rates find it hard to grow fast. Even if we allow for these traditional 
determinants of growth, there is still a negative effect of the volatility of unanticipated output 
growth on long-run growth in income per capita. Allowing for regional dummies, we see that 
volatility is particularly high in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle-East and North Africa and thus 
their growth performance is worse than in other parts of the world. We probe deeper into the 
determinants of macroeconomic volatility and provide empirical evidence which suggests that 
those countries with poor financial systems, restricted international trade, difficult or no access to 
waterways, and abundant natural resources are more volatile and thus enjoy worse growth 
prospects. The effect of resources on volatility and thus growth is upheld if we measure 
dependence by rents (net of extraction costs) rather than export revenue. Similarly, volatility in 
the terms of trade and the share of government spending appear to increase macroeconomic 
volatility and worsen growth prospects as well. Some of the harmful effects of terms of trade 
volatility and resource dependence may be attenuated in countries with well functioning financial   23
markets. A corollary of our results is that the quintessential feature of the natural resource curse is 
the volatility channel. The developed OECD countries suffer much less from volatility and 
natural resources seem to be beneficial for economic performance. Our panel data estimation 
results confirm most our cross-country results but suggest, somewhat surprisingly, that well 
developed financial systems can amplify the effect of short-term terms of trade volatility on 
volatility on unanticipated output growth. One explanation may be that short-run terms of trade 
volatility results from credit booms.  
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Appendix 1: Data Description 
VARIABLE NAME D EFINITION S OURCE 
GDP/capita growth rate  Ln difference in real GDP per capita, Laspeyres  PWT 6.2 from Heston et al 
(2006) 
Investment share of GDP  Gross fixed capital formation as % of GDP  PWT 6.2 from Heston et al 
(2006) 
Average population growth 
rate 
Ln difference in total population  PWT 6.2 from Heston et al 
(2006) 
log per capita GDP  Ln real GDP per capita  PWT 6.2 from Heston et al 
(2006) 
Human capital  Average schooling years in the population (age 25+)  Barro & Lee (2000) 
Natural resources  F.o.b. value of point-source and diffuse resource exports as a percentage of GDP  WDI (2006) 
Resource rents  (total sale value – total production costs)/GDP, current US$ 
for bauxite, copper, nickel, tin, zinc, lead, phosphates, iron ore, silver, gold (ores); 
brown coal, hard coal, oil, natural gas (fuels) 
World Bank (2007) and WDI 
(2006) 
Financial development  Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  WDI (2006) 
Sachs Warner updated 
openness dummy 
open to trade = 1  Wacziarg & Welch (2008) 
Point-source resources  F.o.b. value of exports as a percentage of GDP. Corresponds to SITC section 3 
(mineral fuels) and divisions 27, 28, and 68 (nonferrous metals). 
WDI (2006) 
Diffuse resources  F.o.b. value of exports as a percentage of GDP. Corresponds to SITC section: 2 
(crude materials except fuels) excluding divisions 22, 27 (crude fertilizers and 
minerals excluding coal, petroleum, and precious stones), and 28 (metalliferous 
ores and scrap) and sections: 0 (food and live animals), 1 (beverages and tobacco), 
and 4 (animal and vegetable oils and fats) and SITC division 22 (oil seeds, oil nuts, 
and oil kernels). 
WDI (2006) 
Distance to nearest 
navigable river or coast 
minimum distance in km, fixed effect  CID, General Measures of 
Geography (2007) 
Landlocked dummy  =1 if a country has no access to sea  Gallup et al (1999) 
% population in temperate 
climate zone 
% 1995 pop in Koeppen-Geiger temperate zones (Cf+Cs+Df+DW)  CID, General Measures of 
Geography (2007) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  Index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (0 to 1), probability that two randomly 
selected individuals from a given country do not belong to same ethnic group. 
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 
(2005) 
Ethnic Polarization  Index of ethno-linguistic polarization (0: many small groups, to 1: two large 
groups) 




standard deviation of yearly share of government expenditure of GDP  PWT 6.2 from Heston et al 
(2006) 
sd ToT index growth  standard deviation of yearly terms-of-trade index growth rate, where the terms-of-
trade index is defined as the value of total exports over total imports 
PWT 6.2 from Heston et al 
(2006) 
Rule of law 1984  A country’s score on the law and order index in 1984 (first year available).  ICRG (2006) 
Inflation  Yearly CPI inflation, volatility refers to its standard deviation  WDI (2006) 
Malaria incidence  Yearly incidence of malaria, per capita.   Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 
(2007)   27
Appendix 2: Robustness to Alternative Growth Specifications 
The extensive empirical literature on the determinants of economic growth considers several 
additional variables which may affect output growth. Not accounting for omitted variable bias 
may cause our results to be spurious. The most robust growth determinants as estimated by Sala-
i-Martin et al. (2004) include schooling, initial GDP per capita and investment, but also malaria 
prevalence, fraction of GDP in mining and several regional dummies. Table 9 subjects our core 
growth-volatility specification 10 of Table 4 to a range of competing specifications. We first 
include each variable one at a time and then combine all in one regression. All regressions show 
that the effect of volatility and its main sources stand up to this exercise.  
Regressions 10a and 10b add the rule of law in 1984 (first available year). Institutional 
features of countries may affect growth directly, but also affects volatility as emphasized by 
Acemoglu et al. (2003). They regress the standard deviation of output growth on constraints on 
the executive and find a robust negative coefficient. Our related institutional variable rule of law 
captures this effect well in our simultaneous ML setup, but we also show that it hardly affects our 
main results. We include the average incidence of malaria per capita at the start of our sample in 
regression 10c to capture additional geographical features (Gallup et al., 1999). Malaria 
significantly slows growth, but volatility and its sources are not simply capturing the effect of this 
omitted variable and have robust separate effects on growth. Regression 10d and 10e focus on 
policy variables. Bad government policy, such as reflected in inflation and possibly an oversized 
government could hamper growth as well. We include the average yearly inflation rate and the 
ratio of government expenditure to GDP. They are both insignificant, although inflation volatility 
does (modestly) increase output volatility.  
Regression 10f includes the link between initial income and output volatility as implied 
by the model of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), while regression 10g includes a post oil-shock 
(1973) dummy from Ramey and Ramey (1995). Both are significant but they do not change our 
results much. Remoteness is not significant anymore in 10f, but the effect of volatility is now 
larger, as is the positive direct effect of resources. The negative indirect effect is still more 
important. Further robustness of our findings is displayed by regression 10h where region 
dummies are included in the mean equation. We believe that allowing correlation of growth 
shocks within countries is important and we have clustered all standard errors. For completeness, 
regression 10i shows that not doing so yields smaller standard errors. Alternatively, in 10j we 
include region dummies again but now we take into account the possibility that unanticipated 
growth shocks are correlated across continents and time. Still our results hold. Regression 10k 
puts all additional regressors in one equation. The bottom line is that volatility is harmful to   28
growth and that volatility depends negatively on financial development and positively on resource 
dependence. The latter may have a positive direct effect on growth but it is not robust and in any 




Table 9: Robustness: Alternative Growth Specifications - regressions 10a-10f 
Dependent Variable  yearly GDP growth per capita 1970-2003   
(constant 2000 int. dollars, PWT 6.2)  10a  10b  10c  10d  10e  10f 
Mean equation        
Average investment share of GDP 70-03  0.043*  0.052**  0.042*  0.034  0.043**  0.009 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) 
1st lag GDP per capita growth  0.220***  0.224***  0.240***  0.216***  0.221***  0.223*** 
  (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) 
Average population growth rate 70-03  -0.462***  -0.414***  -0.338***  -0.519***  -0.414***  -0.616*** 
  (0.126) (0.117) (0.122) (0.126) (0.128) (0.091) 
Initial log per capita GDP  -0.013***  -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.035*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
Initial human capital  0.002**  0.002**  0.001*  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Volatility (σi)  -0.883*** -1.286** -0.508*** -0.663**  -0.825** -2.164*** 
  (0.298) (0.529) (0.169) (0.280) (0.358) (0.579) 
Initial financial development  -0.017**  -0.023** -0.004 -0.012* -0.015*  -0.011** 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
Sachs Warner updated openness  -0.007*  -0.011*  0.001  -0.004  -0.004  -0.020*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
Natural resources 1970  0.020  0.037*  0.018  0.017  0.020  0.065*** 
  (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.030) (0.014) 
Constant  0.155*** 0.187*** 0.136*** 0.173*** 0.177*** 0.392*** 
  (0.025) (0.034) (0.024) (0.026) (0.030) (0.064) 
Rule of law 1984    0.001         
    (0.001)      
Malaria incidence per capita 70-75        -0.192***     
       (0.034)     
Average  inflation  70-03       -0.000*   
       (0.000)   
Average share of government 70-03          -0.016   
       (0.012)   
Variance equation        
Initial financial development  -1.609***  -1.581*** -0.661*** -1.589*** -1.628*** -0.894*** 
  (0.101) (0.057) (0.215) (0.140) (0.280) (0.109) 
Sachs Warner updated openness  -0.816***  -0.663***  -0.338**  -0.823***  -0.847***  -0.710*** 
  (0.183) (0.158) (0.172) (0.209) (0.326) (0.157) 
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast  0.001***  0.000**  0.000*  0.001***  0.001**  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Natural resources 1970  1.010***  1.716***  2.344***  1.099**  1.044  1.320*** 
  (0.230) (0.366) (0.454) (0.511) (1.383) (0.198) 
Average yearly inflation volatility 70-03  0.000***           
  (0.000)       
Rule of law 1984      -0.298***       
     (0.020)     
Initial log per capita GDP            -0.445*** 
        ( 0 . 0 0 5 )  
Constant  -6.067*** -6.237*** -5.755*** -6.092*** -6.042*** -2.505*** 
  (0.065) (0.072) (0.073) (0.075) (0.164) (0.052) 
Observations  2024  1863  1863 2014 2024 2024 
Clusters  62  57  57 62 62 62 
Log  Likelihood  3727.3  3579.2  3634.3 3717.6 3726.2 3768.1 
Standard errors clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Region and year dummies are included in the mean equation.   29
  
 
Table 9: Robustness: Alternative Growth Specifications - regressions 10g-10k 
Mean equation  10g 10h  10i  10j  10k 
Average investment share of GDP 70-03  0.044*  0.051***  0.044**  0.051***  0.006 
 (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.019) (0.017)  (0.018) 
1st lag GDP per capita growth  0.224***  0.203***  0.224***  0.203***  0.217*** 
 (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.017) (0.053)  (0.032) 
Average population growth rate 70-03  -0.490***  -0.926***  -0.490***  -0.926***  -0.458*** 
 (0.119)  (0.149)  (0.115) (0.193)  (0.124) 
Initial log per capita GDP  -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.019*** 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) 
Initial human capital  0.002**  0.000  0.002***  0.000  0.002*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) 
Volatility (σi) -0.842***  -0.694***  -0.842***  -0.694***  -1.656*** 
 (0.309)  (0.246)  (0.244) (0.229)  (0.491) 
Initial financial development  -0.016**  -0.019*** -0.016***  -0.019** -0.004 
 (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.005) (0.009)  (0.005) 
Sachs Warner updated openness  -0.007  -0.006  -0.007  -0.006  -0.000 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) 
Natural resources 1970  0.019  0.024**  0.019  0.024***  0.079*** 
 (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.013) (0.004)  (0.028) 
Constant 0.178***  0.171***  0.159***  0.171***  0.268*** 
 (0.028)  (0.023)  (0.026) (0.014)  (0.039) 
Rule of law 1984          -0.006*** 
         (0.002) 
Malaria incidence per capita 70-75          -0.173*** 
         (0.038) 
Average inflation 70-03          -0.000 
         (0.000) 
Average share of government 70-03          -0.012 
         (0.010) 
Post-1973 dummy  -0.020***        -0.017*** 
 (0.006)        (0.004) 
Variance equation         
Initial financial development  -1.615***  -1.674*** -1.615*** -1.674***  -0.588*** 
 (0.141)  (0.050)  (0.115) (0.051)  (0.064) 
Sachs Warner updated openness  -0.841***  -0.812***  -0.841***  -0.812***  -0.288* 
 (0.230)  (0.151)  (0.056) (0.238)  (0.149) 
Distance to nearest navigable river or coast  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Natural resources 1970  1.037***  1.036***  1.037***  1.036***  2.284*** 
 (0.336)  (0.218)  (0.197) (0.194)  (0.497) 
Average yearly inflation volatility 70-03          0.000* 
         (0.000) 
Rule of law 1984          -0.249*** 
         (0.007) 
Initial log per capita GDP          -0.139*** 
         (0.004) 
Region dummies in mean equation  no  yes  no  yes  no 
Clusters (Observations)  62 (2024)  62 (2024)  unclustered (2024) 8  (2024)  57 (2024) 
Log Likelihood  3723.5  3741.2  3723.5  3741.2  3643.2 
Standard errors clustered by country unless stated otherwise. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Year dummies included in mean equation. CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
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